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Abstract. Economic science has – lamented by some, applauded by 
others – turned into a monistic discipline. In this short research 
note, a socio-economic answer to the question of why this has 
happened is provided by combining an economic approach to the 
market for economic ideas with a sociological approach to a 
scientific (power) field.  
 






As several studies have shown, pluralism in economics is a bygone assumption 
(see e.g. Heise, Thieme 2016; Lee 2009). This statement assumes that economics 
had been characterized by pluralism in earlier times. Indeed, the period until 
World War II is often described as a pluralistic period (see e.g. Morgan, 
Rutherford 1998), and the 1960s and 1970s also experienced a rise in pluralism 
after what has been dubbed the ‘The Second Crisis in Economic Theory’ (see 
Robinson 1972). For some, most notably the heterodox faction of the economic 
scientific community and many students, this is a lamentable development and 
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claims for a re-pluralization have been made. [1] For others, it is the necessary 
and therefore applauded result of a science reaching maturity.  
 
Much ink has been spilled on the discussion about the need for pluralism and 
the effects (cost or benefit respectively) of its loss (see e.g. Salanti, Screpanti 
1997; Garnett, Olson, Starr 2010), much less has been written to provide a clear 
conceptualization of pluralism (see e.g. Garnett 2006). One of the major 
problems in the discussion on pluralism versus monism is the obscurity of the 
terms used. Pluralism (and the same holds for monism) may be applied to 
theories, methods, methodologies, epistemologies, ontologies and paradigms – all 
conveying a different meaning. If not stated otherwise, the term pluralism (or 
monism) used here always refers to paradigmatic pluralism. This implies the 
existence and tolerance of adversarial scientific research programs with respect 
to their heuristic dimensions beyond mere epistemological or methodical 
variations within a paradigm. [2] Moreover, even less investigated is the reason 
for or background forces of the development from ‘inter-war pluralism to post-
war neoclassicism’ (Morgan, Rutherford 1998). For those who believe economics 
ought to be monist, in the sense that it eventually spawns a ‘normal science’ of 
the Kuhnian type, there simply is no question to reflect upon (see e.g. 
Goodfriend 2007). For those, however, who advocate pluralism (see e.g. Salanti, 
Screpanti 1997; Kellert, Longina, Waters 2006; Fullbrook 2008; Garnett, Olsen, 
Starr 2010), its absence must be disturbing, and an explanation is badly needed 
in order to propose remedies that might reverse the process of de-pluralization in 
the future.  
 
John King, a staunch defender of pluralism, is among the few who has provided 
an answer to ‘why economics has turned out this way’; nevertheless, he concedes: 
‘and I am still not sure to have the full answer’ (King 2016, p. 7). He highlights 
two reasons: 
 
 the pretention that economics is a ‘rigorous science’ demands a single, 
generally accepted representation of the ‘truth’ based on formal 
reasoning and sophisticated empirical testing (i.e. the methodology of 
positivistic fallibilism) 
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 the economic discipline touches too much on vested interests to allow for 
a free investigative project pursuing every possible trail of thought. 
 
While both explanations may appear intuitive to critical minds, they are not 
entirely convincing on closer inspection from a perspective not so inclined, or, 
rather, they need further argumentative support to become more appealing. That 
is what this short research note seeks to provide: In the next two sections, I will 
scrutinize the arguments and point out deficiencies. In a fourth and fifth 
section, I will unfold a socio-economic theory of the ‘market for economic ideas’ 
and provide some evidence for restraints on competition (or, sociologically 
speaking, an uneven battlefield) which will support King’s explanations. This 
will serve as a foundation for some proposals for re-claiming pluralism. 
 
 
Methodological ineptitude and the quest for monism 
 
Although economics is arguably the strictest social science in its methodological 
rigour (see e.g. Freeman 1999; Colander 2005), economists are usually not very 
well trained in terms of methodology (see Caldwell 1988). By that it is meant 
that in relying on positivistic fallibilism, economics emulates the natural 
sciences in its search for ‘the one and only truth’. The insistence on positivistic 
(‘scientific’) ‘objectivity’ as opposed to normative ‘advocacy’ marked the 
beginning departure of economics from economic sociology as a result of the 
‘Methodenstreit’ which took place in the German-speaking world and elsewhere 
at the end of the 19th century (see Moore 2003). Economics turned into a science 
– emphasizing methodological unity with the natural sciences (see e.g. Mirowski 
1989) [3] – claiming to be ‘a body of systematized knowledge concerning what is’ 
(Keynes 1891, p. 34) or, as Milton Friedman (Friedman 1953, p. 4) stated in his 
famous article ‘The methodology of positive economics’: 
 
Positive economics is in principle independent of any particular ethical 
position or normative judgement. … Its task is to provide a system of 
generalizations that can be used to make correct predictions about the 
consequences of any change in circumstances. …Its performance is to be 
judged by the precision, scope, and conformity with experience of the 
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predictions it yields. In short, positive economics is, or can be, an 
‘objective’ science, in precisely the same sense as any of the physical 
sciences. 
 
Based on such a fallacy, economics is pursued by most economists [4] as a 
science that ultimately will provide a single, generally accepted, historically 
unspecific answer to all economic problems (see e.g. Middleton 1998, p. 344; 
Schultze 1996, p. 26; Williamson 1997, p. 365); i.e. something that can be taken 
as ‘truth’:  
 
…a thumbnail sketch of what a genuine science of economics would 
amount to: it would ideally be a discipline that sought a complete, 
objective account of the ‘laws of motion’ which would causally explain 
the ‘characteristics’ and ‘function(ing)’ of the investigator-independent 
economic ‘system’ in its parts and as whole. Although this conception of 
an economic science does not deny ontological complexity and diversity 
and does not deny human fallibility, it does lend itself to an ultimately 
monistic paradigmatic vision of the future of the economics discipline 
(Mariyani-Squire/Mossa 2015, p. 200). 
         
This strong scientific claim matches neither the necessary ontological and 
epistemological preconditions that the object of inquiry – the economic order – 
must fulfil if ‘truth’ is to be established nor a similarly rigorous methodological 
exigency that is critically disclosed (see Heise 2017). The foundation of 
scientific monism, the ‘one world-one truth’ principle, can be upheld only under 
very restrictive and unrealistic conditions: a) the existence of a single (economic) 
reality and the objectivity of its emergence, which is questioned by post-modern 
constructivism (see Berger, Luckmann 1966); b) the assumption that the 
economic order (or system) is a ‘closed system’ which would exclusively allow for 
(stochastic) predictions based on detectable links between system elements 
(constituting ‘analytic judgement a priori’ in a Kantian sense). Although this 
assumption is highly dubious and definitely cannot be taken as an 
(unquestionable) axiom, this is exactly what mainstream economics [5] does:  
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It is indeed the proclaimed virtue of general equilibrium reasoning that 
it takes into account all the possible interactions between all the 
elements that are included in the model; therefore, if uncertainty about 
future possibilities appears to prevent the completion of the set of 
connections between present decisions and their full set of consequences, 
then we must agree that the imaginative response of Arrow and Debreu 
in extending the set of elements to include all future dates and all 
possible states of the world – which are fully connected to every other 
element in the model – was methodologically appropriate (Loasby 2003, 
p. 291).  
 
However, what is methodologically appropriate for concise model-building is 
not necessarily appropriate for the representation of reality.  
 
If the ontological and epistemological requirements for a monist approach are 
too demanding to be fulfilled, one could still hope for a clear-cut discrimination 
between theoretical approaches by empirical testing – which by itself can only 
establish provisional or conjectural knowledge but no ‘truth’. Yet, due to the 
‘problem of induction’ and the so called ‘Duhem-Quine’ thesis, an objective 
demarcation between ‘truth’ and ‘non-truth’ or a similar objective discrimination 
between competing theories or theoretical systems (paradigms) is simply 
impossible (see Blaug 1980, p. 26). This does not ultimately imply the complete 
rejection of the existence of objective knowledge (as constructivists would 
claim), but undoubtedly it implies the end of certainty concerning the 
establishment and proof of objective knowledge – which is thus replaced by the 
admittance of ontological and epistemological pluralism as a scientific 
imperative of economics. 
 
Monism, therefore, is not the logical result of the pretence that economics is like 
the natural sciences and the indicator of its maturity; rather it follows from a 
methodological error regarding the ontological and epistemological constraints 
of the discipline, thus making paradigmatic pluralism indispensable. 
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Vested interests and economics 
 
There is no doubt that economics covers topics that are deeply affected by vested 
interests. Moreover, the ‘knowledge’ provided by economics surely helps special 
interest groups to gain the upper hand in disputes about policy-making and the 
provision of public goods which simply cannot serve in a ‘neutral (or merely 
functional) way’ the general welfare of society for the reason that such a thing – 
the welfare of society – cannot coherently be conceptualized. Since Kenneth 
Arrow’s seminal book (Arrow 1951), we know that what contributes to the 
welfare of a society is, at best, determined by the majority or, more realistically, 
by the minority who are able to frame their particular interests as the common 
interest of the wider society (see e.g. Bartels 2008; Hacker, Pierson 2010; 
Häring, Douglas 2012). This framing process requires considerable resources 
which can better be provided if one is successfully participating in the market – 
which, in turn, results in a pro-market bias. Taking into consideration that 
universities, the major organisations of knowledge-creation, are in many 
countries private enterprises, it appears difficult to deny that economic research 
and education at these private universities may well also display a pro-market 
bias and disparage more critical approaches[6] – not necessarily as a downright 
conspiracy, but rather as the result of a cultural constraint imposed by the 
patrons of the private universities. [7] But even if this description were right, 
how would that translate into a general discrimination against critical 
approaches if it is conceded that the vast majority of universities around the 
world are public organizations which are free to follow other – less pro-market 
oriented theories and paradigms – currents? Why should that part of the 
economic scientific community not under its patrons’ tutelage still reject 
scientific pluralism given that monism is clearly untenable? 
 
 
The market for economic ideas 
 
The practice of basic economic research and education is concentrated in 
universities. The market for economic ideas is, therefore, determined by the way 
scientific personnel (as ‘factors of production’) – mainly professors – are 
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recruited and the way university researchers conduct their research in a 
methodological and paradigmatic manner (as ‘production programme’ or 
‘technology’). The output provided by the market for economic ideas – basic 
economic research – is a pure public good (see Eggertsson 1995, p. 206) with the 
particular characteristic of a credence good unveiling its value to the consumer 
only after consumption, if at all. Although these characteristics imply that it 
has no price, it means neither that basic research will not be privately supplied 
nor that there are no means to govern the market for economic ideas. [8] What it 
means is that the demand side of the market is not controlled by those who pay 
for its provision – which, at least in most public universities, is the general tax 
payer or, if tuition is charged, the student – but by the scientific community 
itself (see Menand 1996, p. 7) which enjoys academic freedom. 
 
The private provision of the public good ‘basic economic research’ is motivated 
either by being a joint-product of academic education or because it serves an 
ideological purpose (see above) benefitting the financier of the private 
universities. And because the price does not regulate the market, rewards such as 
attention and reputation must take its place. And again, it is the scientific 
community, not the tax payer or the student, that bestows such attention and 
reputation on the producer since the basic economic research is a credence good. 
This, of course, constitutes the need for standards determining what is good 
scientific practice and output and measuring its quality as the basis for 
reputation-assignment. Moreover, the ‘market for economic ideas’ is 
distinguished further by characteristics that call for the introduction of 
standards in order to govern it: at most times, it shows the combination of high 
supply (of academics qualified to take a professorship) and low demand (for 
tenured professors) resulting in a quasi-permanent excess-supply (‘shrink 
market’) [9] and rendering it very risky. This is particularly the case because the 
attainment of a (tenured) professorship requires the acquisition of high and very 
specific human capital that can hardly be utilized in any other profession (see 
Eggertsson 1995, p. 203) and is, thus, associated with high sunk cost.  
 
From this accrues a demand for standard-setting which mitigates the risks 
involved by providing guidelines for ontological, epistemological and 
methodological constraints that mark the boundaries between ‘good’ and ‘bad/no’ 
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economics. On the other hand, due to network externalities, learning effects, and 
high sunk cost, the market for economic ideas is prone to develop ontological, 
epistemological, and methodological path-dependencies (see Morgan 2015), 
creating a situation of ‘lock-in’ which can be interpreted as a process of implicit 
standardization (see Arthur 1989). While in former times, when the scientific 
community was a very small, close-knit elite group of people knowing each 
other, gate-keeping into the academic system of economics had been provided by 
networking based on sociodemographic similarities (‘habitus’) and direct 
personal control, [10] this no longer functions after academic education has 
become mass education and the scientific community has been inflated 
enormously.  
 
Now, gate-keeping is provided by ontological, epistemological, and 
methodological standardization, which is a rational regime from the perspective 
of the individual researcher (minimizing his risk) but may be dangerous from 
the perspective of the discipline if it strangulates the competition of ideas on 
paradigmatic grounds. And the process of ‘product differentiation’ which usually 
evolves in order to transform a ‘shrink market’ into a ‘niche market’ 
(characterized by a situation of ‘excess-demand’), may provide theoretical 
variation within the ‘standard’ paradigm but not the required paradigmatic 
pluralism. [11]     
   
Yet, even if the market for economic ideas were prone to market failures which 
are disclosed in restricting paradigmatic competition, would not the victor – i.e. 
the one who manages to set the standards – be coincidental? Or, put differently, 
why should a market-apologetic paradigm prevail as King predicted (with 
reference to Karl Marx)? [12] 
 
 
Power, hierarchy and the economic battle field 
 
If one wants to predict the outcome of a process of standardization, one needs to 
know the direct benefits of different candidates (i.e. competing paradigms) to its 
(potential) users and the benefit that results from network externalities (i.e. the 
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use that stems from the fact that the paradigm is used by others) which are 
related to the number of users (see e.g. Elsner 2012, pp. 166). In this very setting,  
the process of standardization may become random, once the initial conditions 
satisfy a high degree of equality throughout the distribution of users across 
different paradigms. But even if that were the case – which, of course, is not 
very realistic - other factors may contribute: the endowment of different 
paradigms (or, rather, their academic representatives) with economic (e.g. 
professorial positions and third party funding), social (e.g. networks within and 
without the scientific community), cultural (e.g. editorial board memberships on 
important journals) and symbolic capital (e.g. awards or highly visible positions 
beyond the university) will impact on the choice of and adherence to a paradigm 
as much as the weight that must be assigned to network externalities, assuming 
that some users are more powerful than others in the economic field.  
 
Recent work on the socio-economics of economics has been very illuminating in 
this respect: Taking ‘economic ideas’ as being an international public good (see 
Eggertsson 1995, p. 207) and the economic system as being strictly hierarchically 
structured (see Fourcade, Ollion, Algan 2015, p. 96), a handful of private, elite 
US universities became the key-players in the standardization game. They 
control the journals which frame topics and bestow excellence on research(ers), 
they set the curriculum of Ph.D. programmes world-wide where the ontological, 
epistemological, and methodological tool-kit is passed on to the next generation 
of researchers (see Hodgson, Rothman 1999). These universities are not only 
extremely well equipped with economic capital (each elite US university 
commands a hundred times more financial resources compared to public 
universities world-wide), they rose to excellence under the cultural pretence that 
universities need to be beneficial to the society in order to gain legitimacy and 
acceptance. In a society – the USA – in which the market as the core constituent 
plays a crucial role in determining not only output and prices, but in 
legitimizing income aspirations and wealth distribution in a purely meritocratic 
way, [13] it is hard to see how the economic discipline could not have developed 
a pro-market bias (see Fourcade 2009, p. 33). And even after their strong grip on 
the system had been loosened slightly (and, only temporarily, as it turned out) 
during the 1960s, when the combination of political movements and the vast 
extension of the higher education system opened a ‘window of opportunity’ for 
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economic pluralism, the situation could not be sustained as long as the 
endowment with the different kinds of capital remained as unequal as before. 
[14] Moreover, standardization as a gate-keeping measure became ever more 
important after personal control ceased to work in a world in which half of each 
age cohort takes up university study. In some countries (such as the UK), this 
standardization has become rather formal (see e.g. Lee 2007; Lee, Pham, Gu 
2013). In others (such as Germany), it remained mainly informal, yet no less 
effective (see e.g. Heise, Sander, Thieme 2016). Although this research note is 
only concerned with the market for economic ideas, one might argue that the 
gist of the argument put forward here would presumably apply equally to other 
disciplines of the social sciences such as sociology or political science which, 
nevertheless, have remained pluralistic. I believe closer inspection would prove 
the crucial differences between the market for economic ideas and the markets 
for ideas of other social sciences: The other social sciences are in general more 
‘applied’ (real world) sciences than economics, [15] requiring the accumulation 
of less specific but more general human capital with lower sunk cost. Moreover, 
the scientific pretentions of economics as compared to the other social sciences 
are different: None of the other social sciences would claim to provide ‘the one 
and only truth’ (‘erklären’; requiring a monist vision of the world) but rather a 
historically and institutionally backed understanding (‘verstehen’) of the social 
order, including the advocacy of normative positions (requiring a pluralism of 
approaches). Additionally, none of the other social sciences have developed 
axiomatic epistemologies that could claim to become a ‘normal science’ of 
Kuhnian type and, finally, none of the other social sciences is as hierarchically 
structured as economics (see e.g. Fourcade, Ollion, Algan 2015, p. 96). Therefore, 
even if there was a demand for standardization within the other social sciences, 
this demand could not be met by a paradigmatic standardization along the lines 
of epistemological, ontological, and methodological monism.              
 
 
Re-claiming pluralism in economics 
 
John King is brave enough to concede that he is not sure of the answer to the 
question of why economics turned into a monist discipline based on a pro-
market paradigm. And he is even less sure of what can be done to change this 
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situation, yet proposes the following strategies: ‘...closer co-operation with each 
other (among the heterodox economists, A.H.), more interdisciplinary 
collaboration with the other social sciences, and pressure for political economy 
to be taught as a discipline in its own right, separate from departments of 
(mainstream) economics’ (King 2016, p. 9). Although the quest to strengthen the 
ties among those members of the economic scientific community who are being 
discriminated against and to extend the ties beyond the disciplinary borders 
towards the more open-minded political and social sciences appears a sensible 
and comprehensible strategy, in combination with the proposal to claim 
heterodox economics as a distinct scientific discipline (‘Political Economy’), it 
can only be rated as surrender and retreat, i.e. a Dunkirk strategy. [16] 
 
Now that a socio-economic approach to economics has been presented, it must be 
accepted that a market such as the market for economic ideas, which is prone to 
market failure and is showing an extremely uneven battlefield in terms of the 
distribution of economic, social, cultural and symbolic capital, self-regulation in 
the sense of ‘good economic theories will eventually assert themselves’, cannot be 
expected. [17] However, rather than deserting the market entirely, it might be 
better to try first to regulate the market in order to overcome its failures. As it 
would be naive to hope for a re-distribution of economic, social, cultural and 
symbolic capital in the economic field in the nearer future, regulation must 
create and secure a place for all economic theories and paradigms, including 
heterodox economics which bows to the methodological requirements of 
positivistic fallibilism [18] in economics departments. This could, for instance, 
be achieved by introducing a ‘pluralism codex’ requiring the appointment of 
scientific staff from different paradigmatic backgrounds. This, again, could be 
controlled by ‘equal opportunity commissions’ and reinforced by providing 
financial incentives through public research funding bodies. 
 
Of course, to hope for such regulation may be judged equally naïve, considering 
the way the economics profession is. [19] Still, there appears to be one gateway 
for the introduction of formal regulations: at the root of ‘self-regulation’ of the 
scientific community lies ‘academic freedom’. However, academic freedom not 
only passively safeguards the actors in the market for economic ideas against 
inappropriate interventions from the state; the concept of academic freedom also 
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involves the obligation of the members of the scientific community (and the 
state) to create conditions under which the procurement of knowledge can be 
provided free from discrimination or harassment (see Mason, McCallum, 
Haiven 2015, p. 9). [20] Based on the meta-theoretical foundations laid out 
above, an appropriate organisation of the economics discipline must guarantee 
ontological, epistemological, and methodological pluralism in research and 
education, not only as an ethical principle but as a scientific imperative – non-
compliance must be judged as a violation of academic freedom.  
 
Until now, the violation of academic freedom with respect to a lack of pluralism 
has been perceived only, if at all, at the level of a specific department (as, for 
instance, in the case of the University of Manitoba; see Mason, McCallum, 
Haiven 2015). It ought to become a general device including the principle of 
‘negative discrimination’ until a certain degree of pluralism has become 
established in every economics department and scientific pluralism has become a 





[1] Most recently, this has been done in a volume titled Reclaiming Pluralism in 
Economics edited by Courvisanos, Doughney, Millmow (2016). 
 
[2] For a more detailed discussion see Heise (2017) and Fullbrook (2013). 
 
[3] It has been claimed, though, that many natural sciences such as Physics have 
undergone a ‘pluralistic turn‘ in the past which the economic discipline is still 
lacking; see Fullbrook (2014). 
 
[4] It must be condeded that this perspective cannot solely be attributed to 
mainstream or orthodox economists but is also assumed by many heterodox 
economists; see e.g. Van Bouwel (2004), Freeman, Kliman (2006), Holcombe 
(2008). 
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[5] As is common, I take the ‘dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model’ as 
the core of mainstream economics; see e.g. Carlin, Soskice (2006: 574ff.) who dub 
it the ‘neoclassical benchmark model’ covering neo-Keynesian as well as new 
classical macroeconomics based on microeconomic foundations. 
  
[6] Paradigmatic pluralism entails the acceptance of adversarial scientific 
research programmes with particular respect to their ontological dimensions. As 
the ontological dimension of mainstream economics frames an exchange 
perspective as pre-analytic vision (with the ‘market’ as the place where the ontic 
operations take place), adversarial scientific research programmes would replace 
the homologous exchange (‘market’) perspective with another heuristic device, 
e.g. asymmetric creditor-debtor-relations as in Post Keynesian economics or 
power relations as in Marxian economics (see Heise 2016). It is, first of all, in 
this sense that the non-mainstream would have to be critical to the market 
perspective. However, as mainstream economics cum grano salis holds a very 
optimistic outlook on the clearing capabilities of free markets, a critical market 
perspective of non-mainstream economics is typically, but not necessarily 
equated with market deficiencies, market instabilities and market failure. 
 
[7] For a classical account of the governance of universities acting as business 
corporations see Veblen (1918). For a historical account of some cases of 
individual harassment leading ultimately to the foundation of the American 
Association of University Professors in 1915 particularly promoting academic 
freedom see Haskell (1996). 
 
[8] Some authors (e.g. Albert 2006, Mirowski 2004: 60, Wible 1998) question the 
applicability of economics to the investigation of the procurement of knowledge 
as insinuated by the metaphor of a ‘market of ideas’. This position is not 
assumed here as economics provide helpful tools to conceptualize public goods 
such as ‘economic ideas’. 
 
[9] This characteristic of the market for economic ideas at the level of 
professorial appointments is not coincidental but necessary to the academic 
recruitment principle of ‘selection of the best’. 
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[10] Eggertsson (1995: 204) reports – with reference to Keynes – on the influence 
which Alfred Marshall had on the professorial appointments at British and 
overseas universities in the English-speaking world. 
 
[11] For the distinction between ‘variation’ and ‘pluralism’ see Heise (2014: 
74ff.), Heise (2017). 
 
[12] See King (2016: 8) who cites Marx (1867: 10): ‘In the domain of Political 
Economy, free scientific inquiry meets not merely the same enemies as in all 
other domains. The peculiar nature of the material it deals with, summons as 
foes into the field of battle the most violent, mean and malignant passions of the 
human breast, the Furies of private interest.’ 
 
[13] This is part of the ‘American dream’ and a founding principle of the United 
States of America, based on settlers escaping from feudal Europe with its social 
stratification based on descent (see e.g. Hochschild 1995 and Hacker 2008).  
 
[14] For the development of heterodox economics see Lee (2009), King (2002) 
and Heise, Thieme (2016), Heise, Sander, Thieme (2016) with particular 
reference to Germany.  
 
[15] Economics, for instance, has much more often than other social sciences 
been criticized for relying overtly on formal rigorousness than on relevance or 
realism. 
 
[16] It should be conceded that a Dunkirk strategy – as in the name-giving event 
– can be a successful retreat to a more defensible position. However, it would 
still involve surrendering the economic discipline to the mainstream.  
 
[17] Goldman, Cox (1996: 30f.) distinguish between ‘competition of ideas in an 
unregulated (free) market’ and an ‘adversarial system of discourse’, which are 
often confused. The former does not provide an optimal acquisition of 
knowledge, while the latter needs a regulatory framework in order to do so. It is 
this ‘adversarial system of discourse’ which only scientific pluralism can 
guarantee. 
Heise, Arne (2016), '‘‘Why has economics turned out this way?’’ A socio-economic note 
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[18] This concession is necessary to prevent a methodological ‘anything goes’ 
(which, at least, would clash with the scientific pretences of the economic 
discipline) and to avoid the ordinary accusation that pluralism means 
obscurantism (see Tirole 2014).  
 
[19] One referee noted that my proposals to promote greater pluralism in 
economics by somehow equilibrating the number of scholars supporting pro-
market and anti-market approaches appear to be far too simple to exert the 
desired effect. Although I am entirely willing to accept this critic, I need to 
emphasize that my proposals tried to pluralize the ‘market for economic ideas’ by 
opening access routes for heterodox paradigms and heterodox economists – a 
possible, but not necessary outcome of a different distribution of pro- and anti-
market approaches would be entirely secondary. 
 
[20] Coase (1974b) draws our attention to the fact that regulating commodity 
markets is viewed far less critically than regulating markets for ideas. The 
reason is that regulating markets for ideas is often feared to undermine the 
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